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In the recently published third edition of the book Antitrust & Ameri-
can Business Abroad,1 I examined the historic concerns of the legal and
business communities that United States antitrust law has penalized United
States firms and individuals in their international market activities. This
article examines the very different and more recent issue of whether United
States antitrust law can be an affirmative tool to help United States firms
sell products and services into markets that have been closed to foreign
competition as a result of either governmental or private barriers to trade.
This issue originally surfaced in the 1980s in connection with bilateral trade
disputes between the United States and Japan over the failure of leading
American firms to gain meaningful access to the Japanese market.2 More
recently, the issue of antitrust and market access more generally has arisen
in connection with the hearings of the International Competition Policy Ad-
visory Committee of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
3
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School and Of Counsel, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays & Handler, LLP. This article has been adapted from chapter 20 of ATwOOD,
BREWSTER & WALLER, ANTrrRusT AND AMERICAN Busnss ABROAD (3d ed. 1997).
1 JAMES R. ATWOOD, KINGMAN BREWSTER, & SPENCER WEBER WALLER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BusrNEss ABROAD (3d ed. 1997). The late Kingman Brewster was the author of
the first edition published in 1958. James Atwood prepared the second edition in 1981. I
had the privilege of preparing the third edition. For a comparison of the various editions see
Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad Today, 44 DEPAUL L. REV.
1251 (1995).
2See infra footnotes 18-22, 102-12 and accompanying text.
3See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, International Competition Policy Advisory
Committee to the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Re-
port (2000). See also Report of the ABA Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law
and Practice Concerning Private Anticompetitive Practices as Market Access Barriers, (vis-
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and the continuing controversy over the proper role of the World Trade
Organization in the area of competition law.4
The vigorous and non-discriminatory enforcement of antitrust law can
contribute to promoting an international marketplace characterized by an
open competitive process. However, antitrust law is, at best, a supporting
player in constructing a liberal multilateral trading order, and is incapable of
promoting any single country's exports. This article suggests a small, but
important, role for United States antitrust law in promoting that competitive
marketplace in conjunction with a developing wave of competition law
around the globe.
II. MARKET ACCESS AND COMPETITION HISTORICALLY
The perception that international markets have been closed to Ameri-
can competition as a result of collusive or monopolistic practices is a notion
that has been around as long as the country itself. During the administra-
tion of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, while Minister to France,
engaged in extensive diplomatic efforts to dissolve exclusive export ar-
rangements that excluded American products from European markets.5
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, American exporters con-
fronted British trading companies operating under Parliamentary monopoly
grants with exclusive export and import rights for vast areas of the British
Empire.6
In the early decades of the twentieth century, American exporters con-
fronted, and sometimes participated in, private international cartels which
divided markets by country, restricted national markets to domestic produc-
ers, and limited exports between countries. Other markets were perceived
as closed by reason of domination by public monopolies, state trading en-
terprises, public control of natural resources, domestic firms being given
exclusive privileges by their governments, and the maintenance of both tar-
iff and non-tariff barriers that excluded foreign competition.
The United States has used both trade and antitrust policy to address
issues of market access. The 1940s saw many antitrust prosecutions to
ited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atrlicpac/icpac.htm>; also available at
<http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/marketaccess.html> (visited Feb. 5, 2000) [hereinafter ABA
Report].4See Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Com-
petition Policy to the General Council, Dec. 8, 1998, WT/WGTCP/2. See generally Di-
mosthenis Papakrivopoulos, The Role of Competition Law as an International Trade Remedy
in the Context of the WTO, 22 WORLD COMp. L. & EcoN. REv. 45 (Sept. 1999); Eleanor M.
Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INr'L L. 1 (1997).
5
DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN, 39-42,
47-48 (1951).
6 See, e.g., PETER C. NEWMAN, COMPANY OF ADvENTuRERS (1992).
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break up cartels which were perceived as related to the Nazi war effort and
impeding the expansion of United States exports and investment.
Most markets were closed however because of the protective tariff and
trade laws adopted by the United States and the rest of the world beginning
with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. 7 On the trade side, the United
States executive branch began in 1934 negotiating bilateral tariff reduction
agreements with significant trading partners.8 These efforts expanded sig-
nificantly with the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") in 19479 and the subsequent "rounds" of multilateral trade nego-
tiations which have ensued. 0
The early GATT rounds were devoted exclusively to tariff reductions.
By 1967 the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations introduced the reduc-
tion of non-tariff barriers as a topic for multilateral negotiations. The Ken-
nedy Round produced only modest results in this area, consisting of a
listing of significant non-tariff barriers and the creation of an antidumping
code amplifying on the language already contained in the GATT."1 Even
these limited results were undermined by the United States Congress which
refused to authorize the President to either negotiate or implement an Inter-
national Antidumping Code which conflicted with existing United States
law.
12
Greater progress was made in the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations
which successfully concluded in 1979. In addition to significant additional
tariff reductions, the Tokyo Round produced a series of important side
codes regarding the reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade related to
dumping, subsidies, technical standards, government procurement, customs
valuation, and other areas where the GATT's language was ambiguous or
non-existent.
13
The code process was used extensively in the recently concluded Uru-
guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations as well. Continued progress
was made on both the tariff and non-tariff fronts. Tariffs were reduced to
zero or near zero for a significant portion of world trade. Separate codes
7See I. BRUCE E. CLUBB, UNrED STATES FOREIGN TRADE LAW § 7 (1991). A more de-
tailed history of protectionism in the United States can be found in ALFRED E. ECKES, U.S.
FOREIGN TRADE POLICY SINCE 1776 (1995).
8These agreements were negotiated pursuant to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1934,48 Stat. 943.
9General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
'°The process of trade liberalization would have been significantly increased had the In-
ternational Trade Organization come into existence as originally contemplated.
"Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, GATT Doc. L12812 (1967), reprinted in, JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE
LAW OF GAT § 16.6 (1969).
12 CLUBB, supra note 7, at § 10.2.
S1Id. at§ 10.3.
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strengthened existing rules on dumping, subsidies, government procure-
ment, and dispute resolution. 14 New codes were created relating to intel-
lectual property rights, foreign investment, and trade in services.' 5 Most
codes were made mandatory, as opposed to the prior system where each
country chose which, if any, codes it wished to sign.' 6 A new World Trade
Organization ("WTO") also was created 17 to enforce a new version of the
GATT, new rules on trade in services and intellectual property rights, the
new mandatory dispute resolution system, and any future trade liberalizing
agreements.
The progressive reduction of formal governmental trade barriers have
created incentives to address more private and informal barriers to market
access. There is a growing sense of frustration on the part of the United
States that diplomatic negotiating successes have not been accompanied by
tangible results in terms of American exports and investment opportunities.
These frustrations have been aimed primarily, but not exclusively, at Japan.
There is a growing perception that the removal of traditional formal
trade barriers by the Japanese government have resulted in only trivial gains
for American producers in the Japanese market. American policy makers
have been frustrated that a long series of escalating multilateral and bilateral
approaches have not been successful in creating the proverbial level playing
field.
Since the late 1980s the United States increasingly has invoked anti-
trust-style rhetoric in seeking greater access to Japan and other national
markets perceived to be closed. In 1988 section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 was amended to permit the United States to retaliate unilaterally
against foreign governments which tolerate systematic anticompetitive con-
duct by or among private firms that have the effect of restricting the pur-
chase of United States goods or services.'8 Pursuant to the so-called "Super
301" provisions,' 9 the United States also threatened to retaliate against a
14Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, reprinted in, JOHN JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1995 DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT 174 [hereinafter
LEGAL PROBLEMS]; Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Id. at 253;
Agreement on Government Procurement. Id. at 395; Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. Id. at 366.
15Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Id. at 335.
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. Id., at 170. General Agreement on
Trade in Services. Id. at 304.
160f the codes mentioned in notes 14-15, all but the government procurement code are
mandatory for members of the World Trade Organization.
17Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. LEGAL PROBLEMS, supra note
14, at3.
1819 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(III) (1999). See infra notes 102-114 and accompanying
text.
19 Super 301 originally operated by statute, and now by Executive Order, to require the
United States Trade Representative to initiate investigations against countries which persis-
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wide sector of Japanese goods and services unless Japan opened its market
more broadly.
The United States and Japan settled the threat of retaliation through
negotiations designed to address the structural impediments to trade and in-
vestment in Japan and the resulting persistent trade surplus in favor of Ja-
pan. These Structural Impediments Initiative ("SIl") talks addressed such
diverse issues as land prices, tax policy, distribution systems, savings and
investment patterns, and, to a significant degree, the lack of antitrust en-
forcement in Japan.
As part of SII the United States insisted, and Japan agreed, to increase
enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Act by the Japanese Fair Trade Com-
mission ("JFTC").2 ° Japan agreed to increase the budget and personnel of
the JFTC, bring more criminal actions, increase administrative surcharges
for civil violations, and issue guidelines addressing a variety of common
horizontal and vertical practices which were perceived as restricting access
of foreign firms to the Japanese market.21 While the SII talks formally have
lapsed, they have been replaced by framework discussions which continue
to include a significant component relating to competition policy and en-
forcement in Japan. 2 In addition, similar discussions have been instituted
with South Korea, with one aspect of the talks specifically aimed at reform
and increased enforcement of competition laws of South Korea. On the ho-
rizon lies the possibility of an action program on competition by the new
World Trade Organization.23
Outside the realm of diplomacy, the United States has contemplated
increased antitrust enforcement as a weapon in securing free trade in a
number of ways. In addition to enacting the competition provisions of Sec-
tion 301, the United States Congress has contemplated creating a private
treble damage antitrust remedy for ordinary dumping violations,24 and other
draconian measures to force other countries to allow U.S. firms to compete
in their markets. United States trade policy officials meanwhile have seized
on the existing array of United States antitrust laws as a means of gaining
enhanced access to foreign markets.
tently deny market access to United States firms. See 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1999); Executive
Order No. 12901, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,727 (1994).
2 For a detailed discussion of the substance and enforcement of Japanese competition
law see HImosI IYORi & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW AND POLICIES OF JAPAN
(1994); MrTsuO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN
(1993).
2 1SPENCER WEBER WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 12.07
(1996).22 U.S. Official Calls Trade Talks with Japan on New Framework "Productive", 10 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 977 (1993).
23 ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at § 18.11.
24This would amend the limited treble damage remedy currently available under the An-
tidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72.
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I. WHY TURN TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS?
Antitrust principles have been such a prominent part of current think-
ing about trade barriers for several reasons. Tariffs virtually have disap-
peared as a significant barrier to international trade for most industries.
Non-tariff barriers have replaced the tariff as the continuing issue for trade
liberalization, especially in the area of trade in services and the transfer of
technology. Even when trade negotiations have been successful, public bar-
riers to trade may simply be replaced with private agreements that effec-
tively prevent imports and foreign investment. The host of invisible rules,
regulations, practices, and customs that work against the interests of foreign
firms often stem as much from private conduct as from formal governmen-
tal decisions. Unfortunately, the international trade laws work best in at-
tacking foreign public policies and rules and can do little to address the
private aspects of the trade barriers.
Antitrust is perceived as the antidote for the' private barriers to trade
that are not truly addressable through the WTO or traditional diplomacy.
Antitrust also is perceived as a relatively untried weapon with great power
given the resources of the Antitrust Division, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, and private litigants who may investigate anticompetitive conduct that
affects the United States, utilize grand juries, Civil Investigative Demands,
and the discovery process set out in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
force the disclosure of information, expose foreign conduct to judgment by
American judges and juries, and obtain broad criminal, injunctive, and
treble damage relief, all unavailable to our trade negotiators through normal
trade processes and remedies. In addition, antitrust is perceived as an
across-the-board non-political weapon that avoids the delays, the linkages,
and the niceties of negotiation and diplomacy.25
IV. WHERE ANTITRUST CAN HELP
There are a group of hard core antitrust violations which can be effec-
tively attacked where they exist in foreign markets. The more interesting
question is whether the use of antitrust law against such practices would
have any significant impact on the volume of United States export and in-
vestment opportunities.
Foreign cartel practices are amenable to attack by United States anti-
trust laws where there is jurisdiction to prescribe personal jurisdiction, ac-
cess to discovery or other means of proof, and where an effective remedy
can be enforced. 6 There is no doubt that the antitrust laws may be applied
25The irony here is the past criticism of antitrust enforcement by many of the same insti-
tutional interests within the United States government on the very same grounds.
26These limitations are explored in chapters 5, 6, 14 and 15 of ANTrrRusT AND
AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD, supra note 1. A relatively unusual case where most of these
elements were present was reported in United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, 109 F.3d I
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to foreign activity which either affects the United States markee 7 or United
States export opportunities28 in a direct, substantial, and foreseeable man-
ner.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act codifies this sensible
interpretation of the Sherman Act and its applicability to the export trade of
the United States.29 The Justice Department first articulated this point of
view in its 1977 International Antitrust Guidelines and stated that the De-
partment viewed its "essential function" as "protecting the competitiveness
of U.S. markets and export opportunities." 3P Justice Department briefly
abandoned this point of view in the 1988 International Guidelines by limit-
ing executive branch enforcement of the United States antitrust laws solely
to the type of conduct which produced adverse effects on competition
within the United States market. This limitation contained in footnote 159
of the 1988 Guidelines was explicitly withdrawn by the Bush Administra-
tion in 1992,3' and the reach of the antitrust laws to restrictions on export
opportunities has been affirmed repeatedly by officials of the Clinton Anti-
trust Division.
United States antitrust law clearly can reach foreign cartels which ei-
ther sell into the United States or buy from United States producers. One
form of classic cartel amenable to antitrust challenge in the United States is
the international agreement between competitors dividing up territories and
markets, typically reserving national markets for each member and elimi-
nating or reducing exports to other markets.
A foreign cartel seeking to pressure or coerce customers into refraining
from purchasing United States products would be equally amenable to anti-
trust scrutiny. Such activity would probably constitute a classic group boy-
cott by competitors seeking to deprive actual or potential rivals from access
to the market.3 3 Here, the problems of antitrust enforcement are more prac-
(lst Cir. 1997) in which the Justice Department brought a series of criminal complaints
against a price fixing cartel composed entirely of non-U.S. citizens acting entirely outside of
the United States.
27 See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at § 6.
28Id. at§ 9.
29Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982); Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (1994).
30
ANTITRUST DIvIsIoN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 8 (1977).
3 1U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN RESTRAINTS ON U.S. EXPORTS UNDER ANTITRUST
LAWS (Apr. 3, 1992).32See, e.g., Anne Bingaman, ADDRESS TO THE JAPAN SOCIETY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE
ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (March 3, 1994), reprinted in DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE CURRENT DOCUMENTS, (1994) (Document 3-3-1). See also 137 Cong. Rec. S18,
070-071 ( Nov. 25, 1991) (Remarks of Senator Charles Grassley urging greater use of anti-
trust against closed foreign markets).
33See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); United States v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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tical than theoretical or legal in nature.34 In such circumstances, foreign
firms are seeking to protect their own markets from external competition.
In many such instances, the foreign firms do not export to the United States
nor do business in the United States. They merely are seeking to protect
their own domestic market, often a static or declining market, and may not
be subject to personal jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe, or any mean-
ingful relief in the United States.35
There are few cases dealing with foreign buying cartels which collude
to reduce the price of goods and services purchased from United States
firms. The principal Department of Justice initiative in this area was the
Tanner Crab investigation in the early 1980s. The Antitrust Division was
armed with fortuitous and dramatic proof that a group of Japanese trading
companies had conspired to depress the price they paid for Alaskan Tanner
crab. The Antitrust Division investigated the matter through the grand jury
process and was prepared to bring criminal indictments against the Japanese
firms until diplomatic pressure, and the novelty of the proposed case, per-
suaded the Division to bring a civil case which was promptly settled by
consent decree.36
The principal private treble damage action in this area was Daishowa
International v. North Coast Export Co. 37 That suit involved the challenge
by an American export association to an agreement by Japanese paper
manufacturers to depress the prices paid for wood chips and to boycott the
American producers who refused to comply with the Japanese terms of pur-
chase. The United States court held that the complaint stated a cause of ac-
tion despite the fact that the Japanese producers were acting together to
counteract the lawful joint selling agreement of the American sellers under
the Webb-Pomerene Act.38
Another potential area for the application of antitrust principles in aid
of open markets would be anticompetitive agreements aimed at the opera-
tions of American firms in other countries. Such agreements could come in
the form of price fixing, raising the cost of doing business, or boycotts
which deny the American firms access to needed sources of supply or dis-
tribution. Here, American firms may have to turn to local antitrust or other
34Report, Special Committee on International Antitrust, American Bar Association, Sec-
tion of Antitrust Law at § 4.II.D (1991).35Edward M. Graham, U.S. Antitrust Laws and Market Access to Japan, in UNILATERAL
APPLICATION OF ANTrURST AND TRADE LAW 95, 96-99 (Henry B. Cortesi ed., 1994); Stro-
ock, Stroock & Lavan, Convergence of Trade Laws and Antitrust Laws: Unilateral, Extra-
territorial U.S. Antitrust Enforcement - Can it Work to Open Japan's Markets?, in id. at 113,
121-24, 130-32.36United States v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 20, 1982).37Daishowa Int. v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) If 64,774 (N.D.
Cal. May 24, 1982).3 8 See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at § 9.11-21.
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remedies, rather than American antitrust law for relief.39 In this situation as
well, many of the international defendants will have no contacts with the
United States and operate strictly within foreign markets which they seek to
protect from any new competition. There appear to be no reported cases ap-
plying United States antitrust law in these circumstances, although the
United States government has used the threat of legal action under both
United States and Japanese law to negotiate lucrative settlements with a va-
riety of Japanese service providers who allegedly conspired to raise prices
on goods and services purchased by U.S. government and military installa-
tions located in Japan.
4p
V. WHERE ANTITRUST MAY HELP
Antitrust may be more helpful as a market access tool if the United
States enforcement agencies and the courts are willing to revive a variety of
antitrust doctrines dealing with the anticompetitive effects of vertical
agreements and restrictions that have been largely abandoned over the past
twenty years in United States domestic antitrust policy. The proposed ap-
plication of antitrust principles to the Japanese keiretsu system is the classic
illustration of this issue, especially since much of the pressure to apply an-
titrust to vertical restrictions in Japanese markets relates to trade tensions
between the United States and Japan.
Despite loose talk from political officials and certain commentators,
the keiretsu is not a cartell Rather, it is a loosely integrated group of af-
filiated companies brought together through a degree of cross-ownership
and long standing business dealings. The prevalence of keiretsus in the
Japanese economy and the ingrained preference for keiretsu members to do
business with other group members have raised concerns that the system
has fostered anticompetitive foreclosure of opportunities for any new en-
trants (whether Japanese, American, or other producers) both in the Japa-
nese market and in selected United States markets.42
39See Robert D. Shank, Note, The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement
Policy: Toward a "Positive Comity" Solution to International Competition Problems, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 155 (1996) (suggesting international cooperation and positive
comity will be more effective than unilateral enforcement by the U.S.).
4 0 See Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yokota
and "Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RtrGERS L. REV. 821 (1994).
41 WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 21, at § 12.07; Joel Davidow, Application
of US. Antitrust Laws to Keiretsu Practices, 18 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REv. 5, 8 (Sept.
1994); Joel Davidow, Keiretsu and Antitrust, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1035 (1993);
Suzanna C. Miller, Note, A Double Standard: The United States' Plea for Per Se Illegality of
the Japanese Keiretsu, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1101 (1993).42 In the United States, the issue arises primarily in the automotive industry where
American subsidiaries of Japanese auto producers allegedly favor Japanese parts suppliers
over their American counterparts. The solutions to date have been to apply stringent cus-
toms rules of origins to prevent the duty free movement of automobiles manufactured with a
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Since the landmark 1977 Sylvania case,43 vertical non-price restraints
have been judged under a very broad rule of reason standard requiring a
balancing of harm to intra-brand competition against potential gains in in-
terbrand competition because of the importance of such restrictions in pro-
moting efficiency gains, non-price competition, curtailment of free riders,
and the maintenance of an optimal dealer network. Subsequent Supreme
Court cases like Monsanto, Business Electronics,45 and Discon4 have
made it more difficult to characterize any particular restriction or dealer
termination as a horizontal conspiracy or resale price maintenance in order
to avoid the application of the Sylvania rule.
The general approach of Sylvania has spread to other statutes such as
section 3 of the Clayton Act47 where the standards for recovery arguably are
more favorable to a plaintiff. The various Antitrust Guidelines issued by
the Reagan and Bush administrations ruthlessly applied the teaching of Syl-
vania and its progeny and antitrust enforcement against all types of vertical
restrictions virtually ceased.48 Like-minded judges made vertical restriction
cases difficult to win and a fertile source of sanctions against losing plain-
tiffs.
49
The exclusionary effects of cross-ownership in foreign markets simi-
larly simply may not be amenable to effective challenge under United
States antitrust law.50 The most analogous statute is section 8 of the Clay-
ton Act which states:
No person shall, at the same time, serve as a director or officer in any two
corporations (other than banks, banking associations, and trust companies) that
are -
(A) engaged in whole or in part in commerce; and
high degree of foreign parts between the United States, Canada, and Mexico under the Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement.
43See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
"See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
4-See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
46See NYNEX Corp. v. DISCON, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
47Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914). The potential application of Clayton § 3
to keiretsu practices is discussed in Davidow, Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws, supra note
41, at 9-10.
48U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS (1995); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE GUIDELINES FOR VERTICAL RESTRAINTS. The
Vertical Restraint guidelines were subsequently withdrawn by the Clinton Administration.
See DmSION TO RECALL VERTICAL GUIDE, EXPAND AMNESTY POLICY FOR CORPORATIONS,
65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 227 (1993).
"See, e.g., Center Video Indus. Co. v. United Media, Inc., 995 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1993).
50Graham, supra note 35, at 96; Davidow, Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws, supra note
41, at 12-13.
216
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(B) by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so
that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would consti-
tute a violation of any of the antitrust laws.51
Section 8 has additional exceptions that permit simultaneous service as
officers or directors of competing corporations if either corporation has less
than $10 million in adjusted capital, surplus, and undivided profits,52 or if
the adjusted competing sales of the corporations is less than $1 million,53
less than two percent of either corporation's sales, or less than four percent
of combined sales.54 Even these modest prohibitions do not apply to inter-
locking directorates between and among banking entities.5 5 The Supreme
Court has furthermore interpreted section 8 as not applying to interlocking
directorates between bank and non-bank entities.56
Section 8 only applies to bar simultaneous service of officers and di-
rectors between corporations which are competitors. The courts have re-
quired some proof of the relevant market in order to determine whether the
corporations with overlapping officers and directors actually are competi-
tors.57
As a result of its many limitations, section 8 rarely is used successfully
to disentangle overlapping officers and directors in United States corpora-
tions. Its application to keiretsu practices and structures appears to be even
more limited. Most of the members of any given keiretsu do no compete
with each other, but stand in vertical relationships as supplier or customer,
or as part of a true conglomerate, and hence are not covered by section 8.
Other keiretsu relationships would fall within the exceptions for links be-
tween bank and non-bank entities.
A better weapon would appear to be Section 7 of the Clayton Act
which prohibits any acquisition which would tend to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly.58 Section 7 has been applied re-
gardless of the form of acquisition to horizontal,59 vertical,60 and conglom-
erate mergers.6' There is no statute of limitations on the application of
section 7 and courts have granted relief decades after the initial acquisi-
5115 U.s.C. § 19(a)(1) (1999).
52
1d.
5315 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2)(A) (1999). The monetary thresholds are adjusted for changes in
the Gross National Product after September 30, 1990.
515 U.S.C. § 19(a)(2)(A-C) (1999).
5515 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (1999).
56Bank America Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122 (1983).
57North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.
1973); American Bakeries Co. v. Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 515 F.Supp. 977 (D. Md. 1981).
-s15 U.S.C. § 18 (1999).
59 See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at § 12.13.
60See id.
61See id. at§ 12.16-.17.
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tion.62 Section 7 also has been applied successfully to joint ventures as well
as traditional mergers and acquisitions,6s and has even been used to attack
acquisitions between two corporations outside the United States.6
4
However, in the past two decades, the reach and use of section 7 has
been circumscribed in a dramatic fashion. Presumptions of violations based
on increases in market shares and industry concentration have been dis-
carded both as an enforcement tool and a decision rule by the courts.65 The
process of market definition has become more sophisticated from an eco-
nomic perspective and more complicated on a factual basis.66 The kind of
theories which would be most useful to American firms seeking to effect
structural change in international markets have not been used successfully
to challenge vertical mergers in contested litigation for years.67 In recent
years, even the largest conglomerate mergers have gone unchallenged de-
spite the theoretical viability of theories such as entrenchment,68 potential
competition, 69 and reciprocal dealing70 which have been used successfully
in the past and have never been formally overruled. Newer restrictive theo-
ries of standing and antitrust injury further make it increasingly difficult for
private parties to invoke section 7 where the enforcement agencies choose
not to do so.
71
Exclusive dealing arrangements blocking the access of American
goods to foreign markets would be covered by section 3 of the Clayton Act
which prohibits arrangements to sell or lease any commodity on the condi-
tion that the person not use the commodities of a competitor where the ef-
fect of such practice may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.72 Again, the express limitations of this statute and more
62See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961) (govern-
ment challenge almost 30 years after partial stock acquisition).
63See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
6 See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, § 12.11.
65See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). Evidence of mar-
ket share and concentration have been given progressively less weight in the published
Merger Guidelines of the enforcement agencies. See ATWOOD, BREVSTER & WALLER, supra
note 1, at§ 12.13.
66See e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (Sept. 10, 1992).
67Recently, the Clinton Administration has negotiated a number of consent decrees
modifying the terms of vertical mergers. See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1,
at§ 12.13.68See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
69See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 569-70 (1972).
7OSee FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).71 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). But see, California v. American Stores Co.,
495 U.S. 271 (1990) (private parties permitted to seek divestiture regardless of prior gov-
ernmental review of transaction).
72See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1999).
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recent interpretations make this provision something less than the all pow-
erful trade weapon some would prefer. By its very terms, section 3 applies
to goods, and not services or investment opportunities. 73 While its language
is broader than that of the Sherman Act, recent decisions have tended to in-
terpret section 3 in such a way to make it congruent with the basic prohibi-
tion in section 1 of the Sherman Act against contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade.74
Historically, this was not so. For example, the Supreme Court in Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States found a violation of section 3 whenever a sub-
stantial volume of commerce was foreclosed because of the exclusive
agreement and widespread industry practice.75 However, in Tampa Electric
Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., the Court later required a showing of foreclosure
of a substantial proportion of the relevant market before a violation would
be found.76 Despite much of the older case law which could be helpful as a
market access tool, section 3 claims have not been brought in recent years
by either the Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission. Success-
ful private section 3 actions have been few, and only in those cases where
the defendant's market power was so substantial as to constitute a violation
of the rule of reason under section 1 of the Sherman Act as well.
Reciprocal dealing is another practice which in the past has attracted
antitrust scrutiny, but currently is a moribund doctrine for enforcement pur-
poses. Reciprocal dealing arises "when two parties face each other as both
buyer and seller and one party agrees to buy the other party's goods on
condition that the second party buys other goods from it. '77 The Supreme
Court announced in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.78 that reciprocity is
"one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust
laws are aimed."7 9 In Consolidated Foods, the Supreme Court barred a
merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act on the grounds that the merger
produced reciprocal dealing in the relevant market. However, reciprocal
dealing after Consolidated Foods was invoked as a weapon under section 1
73 See id.
74See, e.g., Barr Lab., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 978 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1992); Town Sound and
Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 743 F.Supp. 353, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affid in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
868 (1992).
"7See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
76See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal, 365 U.S. 320, 334 (1961).
77See Betaseed v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1216 (9th Cir. 1982).
78See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. at 594.
79See id. at 594. See W.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc. v. Carlisle Corp., 381 F. Supp. 680 (D.
Del. 1974), modified, 529 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1976) (reciprocal dealing as part of alleged at-
tempted monopolization).
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and section 2 of the Sherman Act more commonly by a variety of com-
mentators80 as well as in both government81 and private antitrust litigation.
After an initial flurry of litigation following Consolidated Foods,
claims involving reciprocal dealing slowed to a trickle and vanished for all
practical purposes as a distinct type of antitrust claim. Courts began to treat
reciprocal dealing claims under the same legal standards as tying, largely
ignoring any factual distinctions between the two practices. 2 Tying claims
(and reciprocal dealings) were subject to skepticism and criticisms because
of their reliance on theories of foreclosure and leverage. 3
The Supreme Court has never taken another reciprocal dealing case,
and the analogous tying claims brought following Sylvania were subject to
a lower level of judicial scrutiny. This decrease in scrutiny was made evi-
dent by the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parrish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde where the court required that the defendant have substantial market
power before even a modified per se test would be applied.84 These devel-
opments, along with a virtual cessation of government enforcement activity,
have made successful reciprocal dealing cases few and far between.8 5
At the present, the massive and sudden reversal of all of these devel-
opments in order to address perceived barriers in international markets
raises serious issues. Most would question the wisdom of these changes if
applied inconsistently to both foreign and domestic commercial markets. In
addition to rank hypocrisy, 6 the unequal application of United States anti-
trust law on the basis of the nationality of the respondents risks violations of
principles of national treatment found in the WTO rules for which the
United States would bear international responsibility.87
80A list of articles in the wake of Consolidated Foods addressing the anticompetitive
potential of reciprocal dealing can be found in John R. Allison, The Antitrust Implications of
Barter, 58 Cm.-KENT L. Rav. 89, 93 n. 25 (1981).
"1See id. at n. 24 for a substantial number of consent decrees dealing with reciprocal
dealing between 1970 and 1974.
82See Betaseed, 681 F.2d at 1216-17; Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419,
425 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979), after remand, 735 F.2d 1284 (1 1th
Cir. 1984). But see Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1562
(11 th Cir. 1990) (refusing to require same type of coercion as required in tying cases).
83See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and
Policy Analysis, 58 Tax. L. REv. 1363 (1980). But see Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monop-
oly Power Through Leverage, 85 CoLuM. L. Ray. 515 (1985) (concern over leverage as se-
rious continuing problem).
84See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984).
85But see generally Key Enterprises, 919 F.2d 1550; see also Betaseed, 681 F.2d at
1220-21 (reversing grant of summary judgment on reciprocity claims).
86See Suzanna C. Miller, Note, A Double Standard: The United States' Plea for Per Se
Illegality ofthe Japanese Keiretsu, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1101, 1104 (1993).87Selective enforcement of otherwise valid national laws could constitute violations of
the national treatment provisions contained in Article III of the GATT. Somewhat analogous
is the GATT dispute resolution panel which found that the existence of a more favorable
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There is some evidence that attitudes in the United States are beginning
to change in an evenhanded way that would revive certain aspects of the
law against vertical restraints and exclusive dealing. The Supreme Court in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. has reaffirmed the
limited per se rule governing tying, and refused to grant summary judgment
to a defendant whose theoretically based economic defense was rebutted by
contested issues of fact.8 8 In so doing, the Supreme Court is responding fa-
vorably to a variety of new theories that suggest that there is good reason to
be concerned over non-price vertical restraints under certain circum-
stances.8 9 The Antitrust Division under the Clinton administration has re-
sponded similarly by repealing the 1985 Vertical Restraint Guidelines"
which made it virtually impossible for the Justice Department to bring a
case against non-price vertical restraints. Furthermore, the Antitrust Divi-
sion and the FTC have announced in a series of speeches by key officials
that they intend to bring civil non-merger cases when harm to competition
can be demonstrated in accordance with sound economics.9'
The ultimate success of this evolving enforcement policy will depend
on the receptivity to the new theories and cases by a federal judiciary
largely appointed by the Reagan and Bush administration and committed to
a vision of antitrust more receptive to vertical restraints of all types. What
is beginning to emerge, though, are old doctrines and new tools that would
make the bringing of cases challenging vertical restraints more likely than
anytime since 1980. What remains to be seen is whether this likely trend
constitutes a victory for United States business, either at home or abroad.
VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES SUCCESS?
Even if United States antitrust law can be applied with renewed vigor
to anticompetitive practices in international markets by firms subject to the
remedy for patent infringement regarding infringing products of foreign origin, as opposed
to infringing products from the United States, violated Article III of the GATT. United
States - Section 337 - Section 337 of Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT, B.I.S.D. 36th
Supp. 345, 391 (1990).
88See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv. Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
89See Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago
School Views, 58 ANTrrRUST L. J. 645 (1989).
90See Division to Recall Verticals Guide, Expand Amnesty Policy for Corporations, 65
ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 227 (1993).
91See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Horizontal Price-Fixing in Cyber Space, Speech before
the 1996 Antitrust Conference, The Conference Board, New York, N.Y. (Mar. 7,
1996)(Director of Bureau of Economics, FTC); FTC Antitrust Enforcement- FTC's Chair-
man's Views (Apr. 8, 1994), reprinted in, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,136 (Remarks of
FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger); U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Roundup-1993 (Apr. 2, 1993),
reprinted in, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,099 (Remarks of John W. Clark); PLI Confer-
ence Explores Ins and Outs of Federal Agencies' Antitrust Enforcement, 63 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 615 (1992).
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jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the net outcome may not be the dramatic surge
in exports or the net positive change in the United States trade balance pre-
dicted by some. The unknown result of this application is the same for both
the hard core and softer violations being alleged in international markets.
In addition, "success" in using the antitrust weapon may have other less
congenial effects for U.S. business both at home and abroad.
Antitrust laws as an imperfect trade weapon are first and foremost the
product of the differing purposes between trade laws and antitrust laws.
The trade laws presumably are intended to advance United States national
interests in its relations with trading partners through open markets when
those international commercial interests do not conflict with other national
goals and interests. The antitrust laws are designed to promote competition
in the United States market. The antitrust laws are largely indifferent to the
nationality of the actors. From an antitrust perspective, more competition is
better, less competition is worse. Less competition, if caused by collusion
by competitors, significant foreclosure of markets, or the exclusionary con-
duct of firms with substantial market power is illegal.
In addition, the sole focus of United States antitrust law is on private
restraints of trade and anticompetitive behavior. For statutory construction,
federalism, and constitutional reasons, the United States antitrust laws do
not reach the anticompetitive actions of U.S. governmental entities, 92 most
state or local government action,93 or the actions of private persons seeking
to obtain anticompetitive outcomes from those governmental actors.
In the international arena, antitrust law would be limited in the same
manner, but for different reasons. International law, respect for the sover-
eign status of our trading partners, and the need for successful diplomatic
relations with both friends and foes, means that U.S. antitrust law rarely
will be applied directly to the actions of foreign governments or the private
firms which persuaded the foreign government to take such anticompetitive
action.95 Accepting the Sherman Act as being limited to private restraints
means that the public acts and policies of foreign governments were no
more intended to be reached by Congress in passing the antitrust laws than
those acts when performed by state or local governments in the United
States. Thus, many of the barriers to market access which derive from for-
eign governmental laws, practices, pressure, or lobbying may formally or
practically be beyond the scope of U.S. antitrust enforcement. These are
92See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R.R., 659 F.2d 243, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982).93See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See also Local Government Antitrust Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C.
§§34-36 (1997).
94See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at § 8.15.95 See generally A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH No. 20, SPECIAL DEFENSES IN
GENERALLY INTERNATIONAL ANTIrrRusT LITIGATION (1995).
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precisely the type of trade barriers which have been the subject of action
under section 301 and bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations. But an-
titrust hardly adds another weapon to deal with these governmental barriers.
Starting with the hard core antitrust violations by private persons,
which U.S. antitrust laws can reach if the offenders have sufficient contacts
with the United States, the elimination of explicit cartel arrangements in
foreign and international markets would not necessarily increase United
States exports. The classic international cartel has consisted of a market di-
vision scheme reserving markets to domestic producers and eliminating or
severely restricting transnational exports.96
Eliminating such an arrangement would create the incentive for a for-
mer American cartel member to begin to export to international markets, as
well as encourage the other firms to begin to sell into the United States.
While American firms in the past often have benefited from the elimination
of these restrictions, there is no way to predict the net gain or loss to United
States producers in such a situation. Similarly, there is no clear way to pre-
dict the net effect of eliminating the more complicated type of international
cartel which is organized around a price agreement. The inability to predict
results should not undercut the vigor of competition enforcement efforts in
this area, but only illustrates the obvious point that increases in competition
and allocative efficiency do not automatically translate into net export gains
for the United States.
The same indeterminacy holds for efforts to eliminate local arrange-
ments which are perceived as restricting market access by United States
firms. Enforcing competition by law may eliminate the foreign cartel prac-
tices, but may also remove the high prices, the allocative, productive, and
technological inefficiencies, and the lack of ambition that made the non-
United States market attractive to American and other foreign firms in the
first place.
Targeting international cartels thought to impede American exports
and investment also may have the unfortunate effect of mutating the private
cartel into a creature of the state beyond the effective reach of U.S. antitrust.
This could be achieved through either outright compulsion or direction by
the foreign government to achieve the same goals, or by private lobbying
for other forms of protection from foreign competition. For example, one
of the first reactions to the announcement of the Justice Department's in-
tention to reapply antitrust to attempts to block United States export oppor-
tunities was the Japanese announcement that it was considering the
adoption of a blocking statute along the lines of the British Protection of
Trading Interests Act.97
96See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at § 2.13.
97See id. at § 4.17. See also Convergence of Trade Law, supra note 32, at 133 (warning
of potential for backlash).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:207 (2000)
Pressing for the vigorous prosecution of the exclusionary vertical prac-
tices that block the distribution of American goods and services in foreign
markets also has the potential for a mixed blessing in the U.S. It is difficult
to argue seriously that foreign governments should condemn the type of
business arrangement which, if practiced in the United States, would not be
condemned under our own law. Moreover, achieving consistency would
mean condemning the type of restricted distribution and dealer selection
and termination policies that typically have been upheld against antitrust
challenge since Sylvania, Jefferson Parrish, and Business Electronics in
return for a very uncertain payoff in other markets.
Pressuring other countries to apply their own antitrust laws to such
practices also raises the risk of enhanced condemnation of vertical restraints
being used against United States firms who use exclusive or restricted ar-
rangements to penetrate new markets. This issue was raised most clearly in
the United States reaction to proposed Japanese Fair Trade Commission
antitrust guidelines. Although the proposed Guidelines were the result of
political pressure by the United States through the Structural Impediments
Initiative talks,98 the United States Government criticized the proposed
guidelines for prohibiting the type of exclusive vertical arrangements that
would make it easier for a new firm to sell into the Japanese market.99
These fears may be well-founded to the extent that it always will be easier
to use facially neutral antitrust laws (whether in the U.S. or in other coun-
tries) to attack foreign firms than to promote competition by aiding foreign
firms at the expense of powerfully entrenched domestic constituencies.
VII. A MODEST ROLE FOR BOTH U.S. AND OTHER NATIONAL ANTITRUST
LAW
What seems clear is that United States and the antitrust laws of other
nations can be a modestly useful weapon in the fight for free markets, but is
not the panacea that some have claimed. Antitrust can be helpful because
the United States and the rest of the world trading community have com-
mitted themselves since the end of World War II to a regime of free com-
petition and open markets. Antitrust can help when private restraints have
supplemented or replaced governmental barriers to trade. But antitrust does
not work well on the basis of nationality. Markets are either workably
competitive or not. Restoring competition by eliminating collusion and
meaningful vertical restrictions will not ensure more American exports.
Occasionally, it will even mean less.
98See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
99 See Comments of the Government of the United States ofAmerica on the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission Draft Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices in Sole
Import Distributorship Contracts, etc. and Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Distri-
bution Systems and Business Practices, 14 WORLD CoMp. L. & ECON. REv. 51 (1991).
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Antitrust must play an important, but subsidiary, role to United States
trade policy aimed at private restrictions in international markets, thus fal-
ling somewhere in between the elimination of governmental and quasi-
government trade barriers and ingrained cultural barriers to trade which
may be immune from any serious challenge whatsoever. But even private
collusion and competition distorting distribution agreements will only be
subject to occasional challenge when business strategies, market forces, or
sheer luck make international agreements detectable and subject to the ju-
risdiction and meaningful remedial measures of United States courts.
The United States should focus on precisely those kinds of agreements
which are aimed at United States exporters or the American market. Collu-
sive agreements aimed at the United States market should be investigated
and challenged when the enforcement agencies have solid evidence of ju-
risdiction and violation as long as overall United States interests are not
jeopardized. But they should be investigated and challenged as antitrust
violations, not because their elimination may have some negligible effect on
the United States balance of trade or foreign investment opportunities.
Similarly, collusive agreements to lower the price of United States exports
should be attacked because they are hard core traditional antitrust viola-
tions, not because such agreements marginally decrease the dollar value of
United States exports.
The United States should tread lightly in challenging vertical practices
in other markets which appear to restrict United States market access. We
are far from a consensus in our domestic antitrust enforcement as to the
competitive significance of these practices, and risk reducing the domestic
and international credibility of our antitrust enforcement if a double stan-
dard emerges based on the nationality of the defendant.1°°
VII. THE MISUSE OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST AS A TRADE SANCTION
The antitrust provisions of section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act should be
eliminated. They were inserted in that statute in 1988 in a meaningless po-
litical exercise by the Congress to reap the benefits of getting tough on
trade, without actually assuming the responsibility for doing something.
One of the practices which is actionable under section 301 is the "tol-
eration by a foreign government of systematic anticompetitive activities by
enterprises or among enterprises in the foreign countries that have the effect
of restricting, on a basis that is inconsistent with commercial considera-
tions, access of United States goods or services to a foreign market."' 1 '
This provision, added in 1988, has yet to be used to retaliate. However, a
1°°Accord ABA Report, supra note 3, at VC (urging all actions to achieve market access
must comport with national treatment and most favored nation principles).
,0t 19 U.S.C. § 241 1(d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
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number of petitions have been filed with the U.S. Trade Representative
("USTR") on these grounds.
The most prominent example was the section 301 petition that Kodak
with the USTR in 1995. The petition alleged that Kodak had been system-
atically denied access to the Japanese consumer photographic film and pa-
per market. Kodak contended that the government of Japan was aware of
the routine anticompetitive activities by Japanese photographic firms and
permitted such activities to continue. On a number of occasions, the Japa-
nese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") had allegedly observed price-fixing
in the industry and either took no action at all or merely instructed that the
activity cease.102 The petition alleges that the anticompetitive practices can
be found throughout the industry, but primarily involve Fuji Photo Film and
its affiliated distributors.'0 3
The petition filed with the USTR could have led to the imposition of
trade sanctions against Fuji film. However, Eastman Kodak Company
Chairman George Fisher stated that trade sanctions were not Kodak's ob-
jective.1°4 Rather, Kodak was attempting to generate talks between the U.S.
government and the Japanese government which would serve to remove
trade barriers in Japan's film market and make the market more accessible
to U.S. firms. The USTR responded to Kodak's petition by filing a ulti-
mately unsuccessful complaint with the WTO alleging that Japan's actions
violated the GATT or otherwise nullified or impaired U.S. trade benefits.'0 5
Aside from the Kodak petition, only two antitrust-type petition has
been filed with the USTR pursuant to this provision of the Trade Act. Most
recently, the USTR has made a tentative finding that the Government of
Mexico encouraged and approved private agreements to exclude U.S. ex-
ports of high fructose corn syrup from the Mexican market.1 6 Similarly, a
U.S. firm with U.S. patent rights to amorphous metals filed a petition in
1990 alleging that it had been denied market access through Japanese "tar-
geting and toleration of other anticompetitive practices." This petition
paved the way to U.S.-Japanese negotiations that culminated with an
102 See "Privatizing Protection: Japanese Market Barriers in Consumer Photographic Film
and Consumer Photographic Paper: Memorandum in Support of a Petition Filed Pursuant to
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended," at n. 433 and n. 434 (May 1995).
1
03 See generally, Petition of Eastman Kodak Co., Before the Section 301 Committee, Of-
fice of the United States Trade Representative, (tariff petition pursuant to Trade Act of 1974)
(filed May 18, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kodak].
1°4See generally, Kodak, supra note 103.
"°5See U.S.-Japan Film Decision Slated for Adoption April 22, 15 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 679 (1998). See also U.S. to Seek Resolution in WTO of Japan Film Market Com-
plaint, 13 INT'LTRADEREP. 1001 (1996).
106See International Trade, 16 INT'L. TRADE REP. 117 (1999).
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agreement between the two governments to make efforts to fulfill certain
agreed upon strategies.
10 7
Another area in which the use of the new provision was suggested as a
possible means to affect market access involves Japanese auto parts. In
1991, the United States Automotive Parts Advisory Committee ("APAC")
recommended that "the U.S. government begin preparation of a self-
initiated section 301 action against Japan on auto parts based on the failure
of the Japanese government to enforce actions to open its markets, to stop
anticompetitive actions in auto parts trade, and to promptly comply with
Market-Oriented Sector Specific ("MOSS") agreements which affect auto
parts trade.' 0
Two petitions filed with the USTR prior to the 1988 amendments also
relied on similar grounds. Following the Justice Department's determina-
tion not to bring U.S. antitrust charges, a U.S. Trade association, the Auto
International Association, filed a petition with the USTR asserting that the
Japanese government was tolerating activities in the automobile market that
were allegedly in violation of Japanese antitrust law.109 This petition, how-
ever, was not a normal section 301 petition. Although it was directed at the
government of Japan for toleration of anticompetitive practices by Japanese
firms, the petition was essentially aimed against restraints on imports into
the U.S.110 The petition was later withdrawn following a determination by
the U.S.T.R. that the alleged practices of the Japanese government were not
actionable under section 301.
The other pre-1988 petition relying on antitrust-type theories was
aimed at eliminating trade barriers in the Japanese semiconductor market.
The petitioner contended, in part, that the Japanese government was af-
1
07 See Jean H. Grier, Recent Agreements and Developments Affecting Trade With Japan,
789 PLI/Corp 403, n. 237, citing Office of the United States Trade Representative, Press
Release No. 90-52 (Sept. 21, 1990).
"I81d. at n. 247, citing APAC Policy Positions Affecting U.S. Japan Auto Parts Trade
(adopted April 10, 1991, by the APAC). See also Possible Violations of U.S. Antitrust Laws
by Foreign Corporations, Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law, House Comm. on
the Judiciary, Comm. Ser. No. 151 (May 3, 1990) (discussing alleged anticompetitive effects
of keiretsus on auto parts trade).
"gSee Jean H. Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese Markets to Foreign
Firms, 17 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.. 241, 286 (1992). See also Section 301 Petition of
the Auto International Association (filed May 9, 1988; withdrawn June 30, 1988) [hereinaf-
ter Petition].
10 See Aubry D. Smith, Note, Bringing Down Private Trade Barriers - An Assessment of
the United States' Unilateral Options: Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act and Extraterrito-
rial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 241,286 (1994)(citing to Section
301 Petition of the Auto International Assocation, filed May 9, 1988, withdraw June 30,
1988). See also Jean H. Grier, The Use of Section 301 to Open Japanese Markets to Foreign
Firms, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM REG. 1, 42 n.247 (1992) (describing later 1991 recom-
mendation to USTR to self-initiate similar 301 petition against toleration of anticompetitive
practices in Japanese auto parts market).
227
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:207 (2000)
fording leniency to cartels under the antitrust laws. This practice by the
Japanese government allegedly aided Japanese firnms to participate in price-
fixing and other anticompetitive activities throughout the Japanese semi-
conductor industry. The USTR accepted the petition, initiated an investi-
gation, and eventually reached a settlement through negotiations with
Japan.''I
This portion of section 301 is flawed both substantively and proce-
durally. Its prohibitions are broad and ill-defined by reference to United
States or international standards. The terms have received no further clari-
fications from legislative history or agency practice.
More importantly, the USTR is not the appropriate body to be making
the factual or legal determinations as to whether a foreign government is
tolerating "systematic anticompetitive activities by private firms. '" 2 The
USTR is not a lawyer-driven agency. Its general counsel's office is small
and often left on the periphery in setting agency policy. Neither its lawyers
nor its policy makers are in a position to determine factually or economi-
cally the systematic anticompetitive practices by private firms within the
strict time limits imposed by section 301. Moreover, the USTR does not
have the power of subpoena or civil investigative demand to investigate the
allegations brought by a domestic United States producer, or the means or
the time for developing and analyzing the facts on its own.
Even if the USTR accepted all the allegations and proceeded through
consultations to sanctions, section 301 is ill-suited for eliminating anticom-
petitive conduct. It authorizes retaliation in the form of trade sanctions, not
limited to the specific industry where the "violation" occurred.' 3 This pro-
vides significant opportunities for all manner of lobbyists for domestic in-
terests, but no real chance of antitrust relief.
If the antitrust type provisions of section 301 are retained, they should
be restructured to direct antitrust complaints to the antitrust enforcement
agencies themselves. Of course, there is nothing in current law that pre-
vents firms from bringing these matters directly to the attention of the An-
titrust Division or the Federal Trade Commission, since such complaints
from the victims of alleged antitrust violations have always been a fertile
source of investigations and enforcement actions by both agencies. Now
with the repeal of footnote 159 of the 1988 International Guidelines, both
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are prepared
to investigate such cases.
Nonetheless, section 301 would be more effective as a formal method
of notification requiring the agencies with the time and expertise to investi-
gate such matters to consider formally such complaints and to have a voice
1' See Smith, supra note 111, at 286.
"2See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(i)(IV) (1994).
"31d. at§ 2411 (c).
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in trade policy. A "successful" 301 antitrust complaint should result in the
opening of a formal antitrust investigation by the appropriate agency. Then
the Antitrust Division or FTC could apply its full expertise, including in-
stitutional expertise from past or current investigations, to the problem at
hand with the full investigative tools for antitrust investigation, including
grand jury proceedings and civil investigative demands. The agencies also
would have access to positive comity and other provisions in cooperation
agreements with other country's antitrust authorities to develop and assess
the complicated record necessary to make an informed decision to bring a
case under U.S. antitrust law or seek foreign governmental cooperation in
bringing a case under the applicable foreign law.114 In the alternative, the
agency could report, within set time limits, to the USTR that further trade
policy action would be inconsistent with United States antitrust policy or
would interfere with a pending investigation of similar practices.
An antitrust 301 of this sort could be valuable for giving antitrust a
bigger voice in trade policy rather than the reverse of antitrust policy being
held hostage to the demands of trade policy. In addition, giving United
States producers a more formal pipeline to the enforcement agencies over
anticompetitive practices in international markets would return section 301
to its original conception as a means of communication between the private
sector and the United States government over international trade issues
rather than the blunt and unsophisticated cause of action as it has emerged
in recent years.s
IX. CONCLUSION
The reality is that most market access problems amenable to antitrust
problems are violations of other country's antitrust regimes and not those of
the United States. The solution is much less far reaching than the passage
of international antitrust codes or the creation of an elaborate role for the
WTO in the competition area.116 Since the 1980s dozens of countries have
adopted new competition laws or significantly amended existing laws. The
United States should continue to encourage such developments in order to
provide a meaningful remedy under local law to United States firms and the
United States government itself when they are the victim of private anti-
competitive agreements.1 7 Private rights of actions, whether or not they
1
4See Shank, supra note 39, at 175-179.
1
5 See Julia Christine Bliss, The Amendments to Section 301: An Overview and Sug-
gested Strategies for Foreign Response, 20 LAWv & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 501 (1989). See also
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, The Post-Uruguay Round Future of Section 301, 25 LAW
& POL'Y Irr'L BuS. 1297 (1994)
116 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 4.
1
7 See American Bar Association, Section of International Law and Practice, Report to
the House of Delegates on Using Antitrust Laws to Enhance Access of U.S. Firms to Foreign
Markets (1994), reprinted in 29 INT'L LAW. 945, 946(1995).
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correspond closely to private treble damage actions in the United States,
should be encouraged for any party injured in the local market. The anti-
trust authorities of all nations should be encouraged to take action against
private restraints when United States interests are threatened.1 18
There is evidence that such contacts are occurring and could be a seri-
ous substitute to the worst excesses of antitrust trade bashing. The Antitrust
Division and the FTC have regular bilateral consultations with other anti-
trust enforcement agencies. These agencies have assisted when asked in the
drafting and analysis of other national competition laws. In Japan, coop-
eration between the JFTC and the United States government resulted in a
series of lucrative settlements where the United States government was the
victim of price fixing and bid rigging in connection with the operation of
military facilities on Japanese territory. 9 These recoveries by the United
States were substantially in excess of the likely recoveries if the United
States had acted unilaterally in either United States or Japanese courts.
These type of diplomatic solutions are embodied in the most recent an-
titrust cooperation agreement. In the 1991 U.S.-EU, 1995 U.S.-Canada, the
1997 U.S.-Australia, and the new U.S.-Japan antitrust cooperation agree-
ments, each side agreed to a provision dubbed "positive comity" in which
the parties agree to inform each other when they learn of anticompetitive
activity affecting their own nationals in the other party's territory.120 While
the enforcement authority is not obligated to take action as a result of noti-
fication, it is expected that each party will investigate and make a good faith
enforcement decision on the basis of its competition law and not on the ba-
sis of the nationality of the alleged victim or respondent. These type of
provisions should be models for future antitrust cooperation agreements and
should be included in broader types of economic cooperation agreements
such as Mutual Assistance Treaties and Bilateral Investment Treaties. Once
again, positive comity is not a trade or antitrust panacea, but it is a realistic
step which can be far more effective than the unilateral invocation of United
States antitrust law as a trade weapon.
121
A true test of an effective competition regime is whether a country has
taken significant enforcement action, either civilly or criminally, against its
own nationals and not just foreign enterprise. By this test, only a few sys-
tems qualify. Even fewer can meet the stricter, but more germane, test for
trade purposes of whether a country has taken significant enforcement ac-
tion against its own nationals for injuring foreign competitors. The United
States should nudge, but not bully, other countries toward reaching this
lofty goal of making local law a meaningful remedy for their own citizens
'18See id.
"g See generally Lao, supra note 40.
12 0 See ATWOOD, BREWSTER & WALLER, supra note 1, at §§ 14.05 - 06.
121 See Graham, supra note 35, at 99-100; see generally Shank, supra note 39.
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as well as for United States and other foreign firms competing in their mar-
ket. This will only be possible if the United States continues to enforce its
own antitrust laws on the basis of competitive harm and not national iden-
tity.
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